Jump-Dealing and Resale Price Maintenance： An Offsetting Theory and Its Policy Implications

Resale price maintenance （RPM） exerts both positive and negative influences on the market competition. Such duality and the consequent difficulties in presenting evidence have often become highly controversial issues in anti-monopoly law enforcement. We found that in reality, effects of jump-dealing...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inChina economist (Beijing, China) Vol. 9; no. 3; pp. 115 - 125
Main Author 于立 冯博 徐志伟
Format Journal Article
LanguageChinese
English
Published Beijing 中国社会科学院工业经济研究所 08.05.2014
Institute of Industrial Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Subjects
Agreements
Antitrust laws
Competition
Distribution channels
Economics
Electronic commerce
Law enforcement
Predatory pricing
Resale price maintenance
Shopping
Supreme Court decisions
Third party
jump-dealing (JD)
offsetting theory
price monopoly
resale price maintenance (RPM)
price difference in distribution channels (PD)
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN1673-8837

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Summary:Resale price maintenance （RPM） exerts both positive and negative influences on the market competition. Such duality and the consequent difficulties in presenting evidence have often become highly controversial issues in anti-monopoly law enforcement. We found that in reality, effects of jump-dealing and RPM can offset each other. This paper systematically proposed the offsetting theory of jump-dealing and RPM,, and analyzed their policy implications for anti price monopoly, thus providing some simple principles and methods to the law enforcement against vertical price monopoly. This will not only reduce the possible ＂superfluous actions＂ in current law enforcement, but also help avoid compounded mistakes due to difficulties of enforcement.
Bibliography:Yu Li, Feng Bo and Xu Zhlwe （ Center for Economic Analysis of Law and Policy Evaluation, Tianjin University of Finance ＆ Economics, Tianjin, China）
Resale price maintenance （RPM） exerts both positive and negative influences on the market competition. Such duality and the consequent difficulties in presenting evidence have often become highly controversial issues in anti-monopoly law enforcement. We found that in reality, effects of jump-dealing and RPM can offset each other. This paper systematically proposed the offsetting theory of jump-dealing and RPM,, and analyzed their policy implications for anti price monopoly, thus providing some simple principles and methods to the law enforcement against vertical price monopoly. This will not only reduce the possible ＂superfluous actions＂ in current law enforcement, but also help avoid compounded mistakes due to difficulties of enforcement.
11-5578/F
offsetting theory, resale price maintenance （RPM）, jump-dealing （JD）, price ce in distribution channels （PD）, price monopoly
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-General Information-1
content type line 14
ISSN:1673-8837