SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY: THE ECONOMIC COST OF INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS

This paper extends the literature on collective rent‐seeking by introducing the possibility that a competing group may be a subset of another. We develop a model that incorporates the potential for some individuals to be party of both sides of a conflict, which creates interdependence of payoffs. Re...

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Published inEconomic inquiry Vol. 49; no. 2; pp. 530 - 539
Main Authors CHERRY, TODD L., COTTEN, STEPHEN J.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.04.2011
Western Economic Association International
Blackwell Publishers Ltd
Western Economic Association
SeriesEconomic Inquiry
Subjects
Comparative economics
Competition
Conflict
Economic models
Economic rent
Environmental aspects
Experimental economics
Game theory
Individuals
Investigations
Laws, regulations and rules
Rent
Sanitary landfills
Studies
United States
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Summary:This paper extends the literature on collective rent‐seeking by introducing the possibility that a competing group may be a subset of another. We develop a model that incorporates the potential for some individuals to be party of both sides of a conflict, which creates interdependence of payoffs. Results indicate that strategic individual behavior, and the resulting rent dissipation, is affected by the relative size of the groups. We conduct an experimental test of the model and find that observed laboratory behavior corresponds well with the game‐theoretic comparative‐static predictions. (JEL C72, C9, Q5, D74)
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-S7LW92F1-B
istex:0CE1C604039C8CEE6D515CB01A79E41E591C8205
ArticleID:ECIN329
We would like to thank Kyung Baik, John Conlon, David Finnoff, David McEvoy, Michael McKee, Jason Shogren, John Stranlund, and seminar participants at the University of Tennessee and University of Massachusetts‐Amherst for helpful comments. We appreciate the financial support from the Walker College of Business at Appalachian State University and the College of Business Administration at the University of Tennessee, and research support from Shillang Deng and Luke Jones.
ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
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ISSN:0095-2583
1465-7295
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00329.x