Testosterone Administration Decreases Generosity in the Ultimatum Game
How do human beings decide when to be selfish or selfless? In this study, we gave testosterone to 25 men to establish its impact on prosocial behaviors in a double-blind within-subjects design. We also confirmed participants' testosterone levels before and after treatment through blood draws. U...
Saved in:
Published in | PloS one Vol. 4; no. 12; p. e8330 |
---|---|
Main Authors | , , , , , , , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
United States
Public Library of Science
16.12.2009
Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
Summary: | How do human beings decide when to be selfish or selfless? In this study, we gave testosterone to 25 men to establish its impact on prosocial behaviors in a double-blind within-subjects design. We also confirmed participants' testosterone levels before and after treatment through blood draws. Using the Ultimatum Game from behavioral economics, we find that men with artificially raised T, compared to themselves on placebo, were 27% less generous towards strangers with money they controlled (95% CI placebo: (1.70, 2.72); 95% CI T: (.98, 2.30)). This effect scales with a man's level of total-, free-, and dihydro-testosterone (DHT). Men in the lowest decile of DHT were 560% more generous than men in the highest decile of DHT. We also found that men with elevated testosterone were more likely to use their own money punish those who were ungenerous toward them. Our results continue to hold after controlling for altruism. We conclude that elevated testosterone causes men to behave antisocially. |
---|---|
Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-2 ObjectType-Feature-1 Conceived and designed the experiments: PZ RK RSS WM. Performed the experiments: PZ RK SA JP KM. Analyzed the data: PZ RK JP LE KR KM. Wrote the paper: PZ RK RSS WM. |
ISSN: | 1932-6203 1932-6203 |
DOI: | 10.1371/journal.pone.0008330 |