Matching Structure and the Evolution of Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

With the help of both an experiment and analytical techniques, Axelrod and Hamilton 1 showed that cooperation can evolve in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, when pairs of individuals interact repeatedly. They also demonstrated that, when pairing of individual is not completely random, cooperating beh...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInternational journal of computer science & information technology Vol. 5; no. 4; pp. 109 - 119
Main Authors Bouhmala, Noureddine, Reiersen, Jon
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 31.08.2013
Subjects
Computer simulation
Cooperation
Dynamic tests
Evolution
Games
Maintenance
Mathematical analysis
Promotion
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Summary:With the help of both an experiment and analytical techniques, Axelrod and Hamilton 1 showed that cooperation can evolve in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, when pairs of individuals interact repeatedly. They also demonstrated that, when pairing of individual is not completely random, cooperating behaviour can evolve in a world initially dominated by defectors. This result, leads the authors to address the following question: Since non-random pairing is a powerful mechanism for the promotion of cooperation in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, can this mechanism also promote the evolution of cooperation in a non-repeated version of the game? Computer simulations are used to study the relation between non-random pairing and the maintenance of cooperative behaviour under evolutionary dynamics. The authors conclude that, non-random pairing can secure cooperation also when the possibility of repeated interaction among the same pairs of individuals is ruled out.
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ISSN:0975-4660
0975-3826
DOI:10.5121/ijcsit.2013.5408