United Kingdom ·George Peretz QC

• Published in: European state aid law quarterly Vol. 20; no. 1; pp. 713 - 719
• Main Author: Peretz QC, G.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin Lexxion Verlagsgesellschaft mbH 2021
• Subjects: Judicial reviews; Proposals; Provisions; Special drawing rights; Subsidies; Trade agreements; United Kingdom > UK; Turkey; Ukraine
• ISSN: 1619-5272; 2190-8184
• DOI: 10.21552/estal/2021/1/22

[...]though there were some indications during the early part of 2020 that the current UK government might be prepared to develop its own robust subsidy control regime (vague statements by the Conservative Party during the 2019 general election that a Conservative government would set up a UK subsidy regime2 were, in March, reinforced by a statement by Michael Gove, the relevant Minister, to a House of Commons Select Committee that the government planned to produce a ‘robust’ subsidy regime that would satisfy the EU), over the summer of 2020 it became increasingly clear that nothing was being done to develop these ideas into concrete proposals: certainly, there was no attempt (as one would have expected were proposals being seriously developed) to consult with experts, businesses and others affected about the design of such a regime. Perhaps most importantly, Articles LPF.3.10 and LPF.3.11 commit the United Kingdom to giving its domestic courts, on the application of interested parties, the power to review subsidy decisions of granting authorities for compliance with the prohibitions and principles set out in Articles LPF.3.4 and LPF.3.5, and (save where the measure is an Act of the UK Parliament) the power – subject to time limits – to order recovery of non-compliant subsidies. The subsidy control provisions are carefully written to avoid importing State aid law concepts into the United Kingdom’s commitments – indeed, with the obsessive determination of the Académie Française faced with a list of English words in common use in France, every concept is given a different name to that which the corresponding concept has in the State aid rules (‘economic actor’ for ‘undertaking’; ‘subsidy’ for ‘aid’, ‘service of public economic interest’ for ‘service of general economic interest’, ‘ailing economic actor’ for ‘undertaking in difficulty’ and so on). [...]a Joint Declaration annexed to the TCA records the parties’ (non-binding but helpful) understanding that regional development, transport infrastructure and research and development are appropriate objectives of subsidies: each of which reflects a declared policy priority of the current UK government. Perhaps most importantly, and subject to the ultimate requirement that compliance with the regime be a basis for judicial review, the United Kingdom is given a free hand in the institutional structure of its new regime. [...]although the United Kingdom conceded that there would be an independent authority, it is bound only to give it an ‘appropriate role’ (Article LPF.3.9 – a provision which is not subject to any dispute resolution procedure under the TCA).