Immorally obtained principal increases investors' risk preference

Capital derived from immoral sources is increasingly circulated in today's financial markets. The moral associations of capital are important, although their impact on investment remains unknown. This research aims to explore the influence of principal source morality on investors' risk pr...

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Published inPloS one Vol. 12; no. 4; p. e0175181
Main Authors Chen, Chuqian, Chen, Jiaxin, He, Guibing
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published United States Public Library of Science 03.04.2017
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
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Summary:Capital derived from immoral sources is increasingly circulated in today's financial markets. The moral associations of capital are important, although their impact on investment remains unknown. This research aims to explore the influence of principal source morality on investors' risk preferences. Three studies were conducted in this regard. Study 1 finds that investors are more risk-seeking when their principal is earned immorally (through lying), whereas their risk preferences do not change when they invest money earned from neutral sources after engaging in immoral behavior. Study 2 reveals that guilt fully mediates the relationship between principal source morality and investors' risk preferences. Studies 3a and 3b introduce a new immoral principal source and a new manipulation method to improve external validity. Guilt is shown to the decrease the subjective value of morally flawed principal, leading to higher risk preference. The findings show the influence of morality-related features of principal on people's investment behavior and further support mental account theory. The results also predict the potential threats of "grey principal" to market stability.
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Conceptualization: CQC GBH JXC.Data curation: CQC.Formal analysis: CQC GBH.Funding acquisition: GBH.Investigation: CQC.Methodology: CQC JXC GBH.Project administration: CQC.Resources: GBH.Software: CQC.Supervision: GBH.Validation: CQC.Visualization: CQC.Writing – original draft: CQC.Writing – review & editing: CQC GBH.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
ISSN:1932-6203
1932-6203
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0175181