How feeling betrayed affects cooperation

• Published in: PloS one Vol. 10; no. 4; p. e0122205
• Main Authors: Ramazi, Pouria, Hessel, Jop, Cao, Ming
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: United States Public Library of Science 29.04.2015; Public Library of Science (PLoS)
• Subjects: Asymmetry; Computer simulation; Cooperation; Cooperative Behavior; Defections; Economic models; Emotions; Game Theory; Humans; Interpersonal Relations; Mathematics; Models, Psychological; Normal distribution; Population; Prisoner's dilemma; Snowdrifts; Netherlands
• ISSN: 1932-6203; 1932-6203
• DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0122205

For a population of interacting self-interested agents, we study how the average cooperation level is affected by some individuals' feelings of being betrayed and guilt. We quantify these feelings as adjusted payoffs in asymmetric games, where for different emotions, the payoff matrix takes the structure of that of either a prisoner's dilemma or a snowdrift game. Then we analyze the evolution of cooperation in a well-mixed population of agents, each of whom is associated with such a payoff matrix. At each time-step, an agent is randomly chosen from the population to update her strategy based on the myopic best-response update rule. According to the simulations, decreasing the feeling of being betrayed in a portion of agents does not necessarily increase the level of cooperation in the population. However, this resistance of the population against low-betrayal-level agents is effective only up to some extend that is explicitly determined by the payoff matrices and the number of agents associated with these matrices. Two other models are also considered where the betrayal factor of an agent fluctuates as a function of the number of cooperators and defectors that she encounters. Unstable behaviors are observed for the level of cooperation in these cases; however, we show that one can tune the parameters in the function to make the whole population become cooperative or defective.