Analysis of an evolutionary game of pallet pooling with participation of third-party platform

Pallet pooling has been widely recognized as an important part of the green supply chain. The development of pallet pooling is an essential component for the transformation and upgrade of the logistics industry in China. Pallet pooling can, however, lead to a conflict over potential benefits among t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPloS one Vol. 16; no. 10; p. e0256923
Main Authors Liu, Cuiping, Li, Xinchun, Liu, Quanlong
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published San Francisco Public Library of Science 22.10.2021
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
Subjects
Analysis
Breach of contract
Dynamic stability
Economics
Evaluation
Evolution
Game theory
Logistics
Logistics services
Mathematical models
Numerical simulations
Pallets
Players
Rationality
Standardization
Supply chain sustainability
Supply chains
Sustainable development
Third party
China
Australia
United States > US
Europe
Japan
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Summary:Pallet pooling has been widely recognized as an important part of the green supply chain. The development of pallet pooling is an essential component for the transformation and upgrade of the logistics industry in China. Pallet pooling can, however, lead to a conflict over potential benefits among the players. One of the main problems of pallet pooling in China is the reasonable benefit allocation mechanism has not been formed. The pallet pooling system (PPS) with participation of the third-party platform (PPSWPTPP) is one of the pilot modes of pallet pooling in China. Based on evolutionary game theory and a penalty mechanism for breach of contract, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the PPSWPTPP. Eight propositions are set in two basic scenarios regarding whether pallet pooling is adapted to the logistics market to study the stability and dynamic evolution process of the players in the PPSWPTPP. Theoretical and numerical simulation results indicate that these will affect the smooth development of the PPS. The suitable setting of penalties and bonuses, the precise estimation of the pooling benefits, the intention intensity of the players to the pallet pooling, and whether to adapt to the logistics market demand are explored.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
ISSN:1932-6203
1932-6203
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0256923