Innovation in pollution control

Institutional arrangements for controlling pollutant emissions from individual sources are effluent fees, effluent control subsidies, marketable permits, and direct regulation. These arrangements are examined in regard to 3 reaction scenarios in pollution control: 1. no change in marginal conditions...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of environmental economics and management Vol. 13; no. 1; pp. 18 - 29
Main Authors Downing, Paul B, White, Lawrence J
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Elsevier Inc 01.03.1986
Elsevier
Academic Press
Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc
SeriesJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Subjects
Cost control
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Effluents
Emissions
Environment
Innovations
Luftverschmutzung
Pollution control
Subsidies
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Summary:Institutional arrangements for controlling pollutant emissions from individual sources are effluent fees, effluent control subsidies, marketable permits, and direct regulation. These arrangements are examined in regard to 3 reaction scenarios in pollution control: 1. no change in marginal conditions, 2. alterations in marginal conditions due to innovation, without control authority adjustment, and 3. change in marginal conditions due to innovation, with proper control authority adjustment. Under the first scenario, effluent fees, subsidies, and marketable permits will produce optimal emissions, and direct regulation will allow levels that are too high. With the 2nd scenario, the emissions are too high under direct regulation and too low under effluent fees and subsidies. The 3rd scenario produces optimal emissions levels under all 4 arrangements.
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ISSN:0095-0696
1096-0449
DOI:10.1016/0095-0696(86)90014-8