Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games

Several recent theories in behavioral game theory seek to explain the behavior of subjects in experimental bargaining games. These models can be partitioned into two classes: outcome-based and intention-based. Outcome-based models treat the intentions that players attribute to one another as unneces...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 267 - 275
Main Authors McCabe, Kevin A., Rigdon, Mary L., Smith, Vernon L.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.10.2003
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subjects
Bargaining
Economic behaviour
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Game theory
Hypotheses
Intentions
Organization theory
Reciprocity
Studies
Trust
C78
Reciprocity
Bargaining
Intentions
C91
Trust
C72
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Summary:Several recent theories in behavioral game theory seek to explain the behavior of subjects in experimental bargaining games. These models can be partitioned into two classes: outcome-based and intention-based. Outcome-based models treat the intentions that players attribute to one another as unnecessary for predicting behavior. Intention-based approaches, and in particular the trust and reciprocity (TR) hypothesis, rely on this attribution of intentions in an essential way. We report laboratory data from simple two-person trust games which is inconsistent with outcome-based models, but predicted by the trust and reciprocity hypothesis.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
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ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00003-9