Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness
Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an un...
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Published in | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS Vol. 113; no. 31; pp. 8658 - 8663 |
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Main Authors | , , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
United States
National Academy of Sciences
02.08.2016
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decision-making is operationalized by either a subject’s choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Furthermore, we confirm that people who engage in uncalculating cooperation are perceived as, and actually are, more trustworthy than people who cooperate in a calculating way. Taken together, these data provide the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness, and is not merely an efficient decision-making strategy that reduces cognitive costs. Our results thus help to explain a range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic love. |
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Bibliography: | SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 Edited by Susan T. Fiske, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved June 14, 2016 (received for review January 23, 2016) Author contributions: J.J.J., M.H., M.A.N., and D.G.R. designed research; J.J.J. performed research; J.J.J. and D.G.R. analyzed data; and J.J.J., M.H., M.A.N., and D.G.R. wrote the paper. |
ISSN: | 0027-8424 1091-6490 1091-6490 |
DOI: | 10.1073/pnas.1601280113 |