The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility

The fact that changes of focus affect intuitions of responsibility raises questions: On what factors should we focus our attention? What focus makes for reliable intuitions? Clearly, more arguments are needed; what is far from clear is what sort of argument we should be looking for. This paper appro...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inNoûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 46; no. 2; pp. 326 - 354
Main Authors Björnsson, Gunnar, Persson, Karl
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden, USA Blackwell Publishing Inc 01.06.2012
Wiley-Blackwell
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects
Criminal motive
Determinism
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
explanation
Filosofi
Filosofiämnen
Free will
Historisk-filosofiska ämnen
History and philosophy subjects
HUMANIORA och RELIGIONSVETENSKAP
HUMANITIES and RELIGION
Intuition
Judgment
judgments of moral responsibility
Moral judgment
moral psychology
Moral responsibility
Morality
Motivation
Philosophy
Philosophy subjects
Practical Philosophy
Praktisk filosofi
Reason
scepticism
skepticism
Knowledge theory
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Summary:The fact that changes of focus affect intuitions of responsibility raises questions: On what factors should we focus our attention? What focus makes for reliable intuitions? Clearly, more arguments are needed; what is far from clear is what sort of argument we should be looking for. This paper approaches the problem from a new angle. It would be easier to determine what to think about moral responsibility if we were clearer about why we react the way we do to these arguments, and why our reactions vary.
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SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ISSN:0029-4624
1468-0068
1468-0068
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00813.x