Exploiting a cognitive bias promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments

The decoy effect is a cognitive bias documented in behavioural economics by which the presence of a third, (partly) inferior choice causes a significant shift in people’s preference for other items. Here, we performed an experiment with human volunteers who played a variant of the repeated prisoner’...

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Published inNature communications Vol. 9; no. 1; pp. 2954 - 7
Main Authors Wang, Zhen, Jusup, Marko, Shi, Lei, Lee, Joung-Hun, Iwasa, Yoh, Boccaletti, Stefano
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Nature Publishing Group UK 27.07.2018
Nature Publishing Group
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Summary:The decoy effect is a cognitive bias documented in behavioural economics by which the presence of a third, (partly) inferior choice causes a significant shift in people’s preference for other items. Here, we performed an experiment with human volunteers who played a variant of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in which the standard options of “cooperate” and “defect” are supplemented with a new, decoy option, “reward”. We show that although volunteers rarely chose the decoy option, its availability sparks a significant increase in overall cooperativeness and improves the likelihood of success for cooperative individuals in this game. The presence of the decoy increased willingness of volunteers to cooperate in the first step of each game, leading to subsequent propagation of such willingness by (noisy) tit-for-tat. Our study thus points to decoys as a means to elicit voluntary prosocial action across a spectrum of collective endeavours. The decoy effect refers to the fact that the presence of a third option can shift people’s preferences between two other options even though the third option is inferior to both. Here, the authors show how the decoy effect can enhance cooperation in a social dilemma, the repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
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ISSN:2041-1723
2041-1723
DOI:10.1038/s41467-018-05259-5