A Theory of Voluntary Unrequited International Transfers

This paper proposes a theory of voluntary unrequited international transfers which explicitly allows for an international externality such that the well being of each country is influenced by the well being of other countries. Formulating a simple two–country and two–commodity model, this paper show...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJapanese economic review (Oxford, England) Vol. 53; no. 3; pp. 290 - 300
Main Authors Kemp, Murray C., Shimomura, Koji
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 01.09.2002
Japanese Economic Association
Springer Nature B.V
SeriesThe Japanese Economic Review
Subjects
Consumption
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Foreign aid
Prosperity
Studies
Wealth transfers
Well-being
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Summary:This paper proposes a theory of voluntary unrequited international transfers which explicitly allows for an international externality such that the well being of each country is influenced by the well being of other countries. Formulating a simple two–country and two–commodity model, this paper shows that (a) either neither country extends aid to the other, or one country extends aid and both countries benefit from the aid; and (b) there exist acceptable (Arrow–Debreu) economies such that neither country extends aid to the other, and there exist acceptable economies such that one country extends aid to the other. JEL Classification Numbers: F11, F35.
Bibliography:istex:202359155805C1DF1CC0FBC23EFAA6E3F4A3459D
ark:/67375/WNG-F37NBDWG-W
ArticleID:JERE229
ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:1352-4739
1468-5876
DOI:10.1111/1468-5876.00229