Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences

Recently Kajii and Ui (2009) [17] proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2009) [17] proposed a necessary an...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economic theory Vol. 145; no. 5; pp. 1987 - 2017
Main Author Martins da Rocha, Victor Filipe
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Elsevier Inc 01.09.2010
Elsevier
Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc
SeriesJournal of Economic Theory
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Summary:Recently Kajii and Ui (2009) [17] proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2009) [17] proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa–Schmeidler's MaxMin expected utility preferences, they only propose a sufficient condition. The objective of this paper is to complete Kajii and Ui's work by proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency for various models of ambiguity aversion and in particular MaxMin expected utility. Our proof is based on a direct application of some results proposed by Rigotti, Shannon and Stralecki (2008) [24].
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0022-0531
1095-7235
DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.002