Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences
Recently Kajii and Ui (2009) [17] proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2009) [17] proposed a necessary an...
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Published in | Journal of economic theory Vol. 145; no. 5; pp. 1987 - 2017 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
New York
Elsevier Inc
01.09.2010
Elsevier Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc |
Series | Journal of Economic Theory |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Recently Kajii and Ui (2009)
[17] proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2009)
[17] proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa–Schmeidler's MaxMin expected utility preferences, they only propose a sufficient condition. The objective of this paper is to complete Kajii and Ui's work by proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency for various models of ambiguity aversion and in particular MaxMin expected utility. Our proof is based on a direct application of some results proposed by Rigotti, Shannon and Stralecki (2008)
[24]. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0022-0531 1095-7235 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.002 |