The economics of land title reform
This paper develops a model of land title reform in which the voluntary adoption of a new system is not likely to be successful, even if the new system Pareto dominates the existing one. The problem is an externality that prevents individual landowners from internalizing fully the benefits of the ne...
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Published in | Journal of Comparative Economics Vol. 31; no. 2; pp. 246 - 256 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
San Diego
Elsevier Inc
01.06.2003
Elsevier Elsevier BV |
Series | Journal of Comparative Economics |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | This paper develops a model of land title reform in which the voluntary adoption of a new system is not likely to be successful, even if the new system Pareto dominates the existing one. The problem is an externality that prevents individual landowners from internalizing fully the benefits of the new system. Some evidence is presented based on historic efforts to institute land registration in the United States and England. Implications are also drawn for ongoing attempts by developing countries to establish formal property rights systems for land in support of a policy to spur economic growth. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0147-5967 1095-7227 |
DOI: | 10.1016/S0147-5967(03)00041-6 |