The economics of land title reform

This paper develops a model of land title reform in which the voluntary adoption of a new system is not likely to be successful, even if the new system Pareto dominates the existing one. The problem is an externality that prevents individual landowners from internalizing fully the benefits of the ne...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of Comparative Economics Vol. 31; no. 2; pp. 246 - 256
Main Authors Miceli, Thomas J., Kieyah, Joseph
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published San Diego Elsevier Inc 01.06.2003
Elsevier
Elsevier BV
SeriesJournal of Comparative Economics
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Summary:This paper develops a model of land title reform in which the voluntary adoption of a new system is not likely to be successful, even if the new system Pareto dominates the existing one. The problem is an externality that prevents individual landowners from internalizing fully the benefits of the new system. Some evidence is presented based on historic efforts to institute land registration in the United States and England. Implications are also drawn for ongoing attempts by developing countries to establish formal property rights systems for land in support of a policy to spur economic growth.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0147-5967
1095-7227
DOI:10.1016/S0147-5967(03)00041-6