On the design of agricultural policy mechanisms

The fact that different agricultural policy mechanisms have emerged for different commodities suggests that the choice of policy instrument may reflect the goals of agricultural policy makers. This paper uses the principles of mechanism design under asymmetric information to examine the motivations...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAmerican journal of agricultural economics Vol. 74; no. 3
Main Author Chambers, R.G. (University of Maryland)
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 01.08.1992
Subjects
CONCEPTION
DISENO
ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA
ETATS UNIS
FONCTION DE DEMANDE
FUNCIONES DE LA DEMANDA
MODELE MATHEMATIQUE
MODELOS MATEMATICOS
OFERTA
OFFRE
POLITICA AGRICOLA
POLITIQUE AGRICOLE
REGULACION DE LA PRODUCCION
REGULATION DE LA PRODUCTION
SUBSIDIOS
SUBVENTION
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Summary:The fact that different agricultural policy mechanisms have emerged for different commodities suggests that the choice of policy instrument may reflect the goals of agricultural policy makers. This paper uses the principles of mechanism design under asymmetric information to examine the motivations underlying the choice of agricultural policy mechanisms. It is found that supply control mechanisms favor high-cost producers and the budget, while mechanisms resulting in overproduction favor low-cost producers
Bibliography:E10
9307226
E70
ISSN:0002-9092
1467-8276
DOI:10.2307/1242577