European competition policy modernization: From notifications to legal exception

Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force in May 2004 and replaced the mandatory notification of agreements by a regime of ex post monitoring. This paper shows that ex post monitoring is the optimal audit regime when the competition authority's probability of error is low. On the other han...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEuropean economic review Vol. 52; no. 1; pp. 77 - 98
Main Authors Loss, Frédéric, Malavolti-Grimal, Estelle, Vergé, Thibaud, Bergès-Sennou, Fabian
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 2008
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesEuropean Economic Review
Subjects
Agreements
Auditing
Competition
Competition policy
Economic theory
Economics and Finance
Error
Errors
Financial economics
Humanities and Social Sciences
Imperfect audit
Legislation
Modernization
Policy analysis
Probability
Studies
Europe
L4
D8
Competition policy
Imperfect audit
imperfect audit
competition policy
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Summary:Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force in May 2004 and replaced the mandatory notification of agreements by a regime of ex post monitoring. This paper shows that ex post monitoring is the optimal audit regime when the competition authority's probability of error is low. On the other hand, the notification system becomes optimal when the competition authority's probability of error is high. The paper also shows that block exemptions and black list (regimes of per se (il)legality) should be implemented when the agreements’ expected welfare impact is very high and very low, respectively.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0014-2921
1873-572X
DOI:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.02.001