Can the shadow of the future harm cooperation?

It is generally thought that in long-term relationships high valuations of the future are conducive to cooperation. In an intertemporal model of conflict, however, we demonstrate the possibility of the opposite effect: a longer shadow of the future may harm cooperation. In particular, we show that t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 29; no. 3; pp. 355 - 372
Main Authors Skaperdas, Stergios, Syropoulos, Constantinos
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.05.1996
Elsevier
North-Holland Pub. Co
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subjects
Appropriation
Conflict
Cooperation
Economic conditions
Economic cooperation
Economic models
Economic theory
Growth rate
Studies
Time dependence
Valuation
D30
Time dependence
Appropriation
Conflict
K42
D70
C72
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Summary:It is generally thought that in long-term relationships high valuations of the future are conducive to cooperation. In an intertemporal model of conflict, however, we demonstrate the possibility of the opposite effect: a longer shadow of the future may harm cooperation. In particular, we show that the degree of inefficiency is positively related to: (i) the agents' valuation of the future, (ii) potential growth rates in resources, (iii) the size of initial resource endowments, and (iv) the effectiveness of conflict.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/0167-2681(95)00077-1