Wage Elasticities in Working and Volunteering: The Role of Reference Points in a Laboratory Study
We experimentally test how effort responds to wages—randomly assigned to accrue to individuals or to a charity—in the presence of expectations-based reference points or targets. When individuals earn money for themselves, higher wages lead to higher effort with relatively muted targeting behavior. W...
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Published in | Management science Vol. 65; no. 1; pp. 413 - 425 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Linthicum
INFORMS
01.01.2019
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | We experimentally test how effort responds to wages—randomly assigned to accrue to individuals or to a charity—in the presence of expectations-based reference points or targets. When individuals earn money for themselves, higher wages lead to higher effort with relatively muted targeting behavior. When individuals earn money for a charity, higher wages instead lead to lower effort with substantial targeting behavior. A reference-dependent theoretical framework suggests an explanation for this differential impact: when individuals place less value on earnings, such as when accruing earnings for a charity instead of themselves, more targeting behavior and a more sluggish response to incentives should result. Results from an additional experiment add support to this explanation. When individuals select into earning money for a charity and thus likely place a higher value on those earnings, targeting behavior is muted and no longer generates a negative effort response to higher wages.
Data and the online appendix are available at
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2870
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This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. |
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ISSN: | 0025-1909 1526-5501 |
DOI: | 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2870 |