Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: Evidence from an experimental coordination game

• Published in: Economics letters Vol. 88; no. 2; pp. 214 - 220
• Main Authors: Chmura, Thorsten, Kube, Sebastian, Pitz, Thomas, Puppe, Clemens
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier B.V 01.08.2005; Elsevier
• Series: Economics Letters
• Subjects: Beliefs; Coordination games; Distribution; Economic equilibrium; Equilibrium selection; Experimental economics; Experimental games; Fairness; Game theory; Mathematical methods; Preferences; D63; Experimental games; Equilibrium selection; Coordination games; C91; Fairness; C72

We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which two players can coordinate either on an equal distribution of payoffs or on a Pareto superior but unequal distribution of payoffs. We find that the higher the difference in individual payoffs, the less likely is a successful coord...