Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: Evidence from an experimental coordination game

We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which two players can coordinate either on an equal distribution of payoffs or on a Pareto superior but unequal distribution of payoffs. We find that the higher the difference in individual payoffs, the less likely is a successful coord...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics letters Vol. 88; no. 2; pp. 214 - 220
Main Authors Chmura, Thorsten, Kube, Sebastian, Pitz, Thomas, Puppe, Clemens
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.08.2005
Elsevier
SeriesEconomics Letters
Subjects
Beliefs
Coordination games
Distribution
Economic equilibrium
Equilibrium selection
Experimental economics
Experimental games
Fairness
Game theory
Mathematical methods
Preferences
D63
Experimental games
Equilibrium selection
Coordination games
C91
Fairness
C72
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which two players can coordinate either on an equal distribution of payoffs or on a Pareto superior but unequal distribution of payoffs. We find that the higher the difference in individual payoffs, the less likely is a successful coordination on the Pareto superior distribution. While this is well in line with the recent models of inequity aversion, our results are best explained not by a preference for equality per se but rather by the belief that the opponent has such a preference.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.009