Public goods and the value of product quality regulations: the case of food safety

The paper examines preferences for product quality regulations. Our premise is that preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and public goods. The model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to eliminate pesticide residues on food...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of public economics Vol. 87; no. 3; pp. 799 - 817
Main Authors Hamilton, Stephen F., Sunding, David L., Zilberman, David
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.03.2003
Elsevier
SeriesJournal of Public Economics
Subjects
Case studies
Consumer behaviour
Economics
Food safety
Product quality
Public economics
Public goods
Regulation
Value
Voting choice, Consumer behavior
Voting choice, Consumer behavior
D10
H41
H42
I10
Public goods
D72
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Summary:The paper examines preferences for product quality regulations. Our premise is that preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and public goods. The model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to eliminate pesticide residues on food. Results from a survey of consumers are consistent with the conceptual model and show that preferences for public goods influence support for the product quality regulation. The results help explain why consumption behavior is a poor predictor of political behavior, and have implications for methods that use voting and market behavior to value public goods.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0047-2727
1879-2316
DOI:10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00103-7