Proto-coalition bargaining and the core
In the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise, a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this m...
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Published in | Economic theory Vol. 51; no. 3; pp. 581 - 599 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Berlin/Heidelberg
Springer
01.11.2012
Springer-Verlag Springer Nature B.V |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | In the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise, a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by allowing F to revise the chosen proto-coalition after rejections, that he states pre-conditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F's opponents may publicly pre-commit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F's opponents can pre-commit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why "important" coalition members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than others. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0938-2259 1432-0479 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-011-0608-8 |