Rational preference and rationalizable choice
We study a decision maker characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects his judgments about well-being, his mental preferences. The second describes the decision maker's choice behavior, his behavioral preferences. We propose axioms that describe a relation between these two prefere...
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Published in | Economic theory Vol. 69; no. 1; pp. 61 - 105 |
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Main Authors | , , , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Berlin/Heidelberg
Springer
01.02.2020
Springer Berlin Heidelberg Springer Nature B.V |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | We study a decision maker characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects his judgments about well-being, his mental preferences. The second describes the decision maker's choice behavior, his behavioral preferences. We propose axioms that describe a relation between these two preferences, so between mind and behavior, thus disentangling two different perspectives on preferences: a description of tastes (and attitudes) and a way to organize behavioral data. We obtain two representations: one in which mental preferences uniquely determine choice behavior, another for which mental preferences direct behavior but room remains for biases and framing effects. Our results also provide a foundation for a decision analysis procedure called robust ordinal regression and proposed by Greco et al. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
ISSN: | 0938-2259 1432-0479 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-018-1157-1 |