Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior

• Published in: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Vol. 11; no. 1; pp. 1 - 24
• Main Authors: Cox, James C., Sadiraj, Klarita, Sadiraj, Vjollca
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Boston Springer US 01.03.2008; Springer; Springer Nature B.V
• Series: Experimental Economics
• Subjects: American dollar; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Design; Economic behaviour; Economic models; Economic psychology; Economic theory; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Economics; Economics and Finance; Endowment; Experimental economics; Experiments; Fear; Game Theory; Games; Hypothesis testing; Impact analysis; Methodology; Microeconomics; Moonlighting; Operations Research/Decision Theory; Parsimony; Reciprocity; Social and Behav. Sciences; Studies; Theory; Trust; United States > US; Europe; Fear; Methodology; Theory; Reciprocity; Parsimony; Experiments; Trust

This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negat...