Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior

• Published in: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Vol. 11; no. 1; pp. 1 - 24
• Main Authors: Cox, James C., Sadiraj, Klarita, Sadiraj, Vjollca
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Boston Springer US 01.03.2008; Springer; Springer Nature B.V
• Series: Experimental Economics
• Subjects: American dollar; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Design; Economic behaviour; Economic models; Economic psychology; Economic theory; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Economics; Economics and Finance; Endowment; Experimental economics; Experiments; Fear; Game Theory; Games; Hypothesis testing; Impact analysis; Methodology; Microeconomics; Moonlighting; Operations Research/Decision Theory; Parsimony; Reciprocity; Social and Behav. Sciences; Studies; Theory; Trust; United States > US; Europe; Fear; Methodology; Theory; Reciprocity; Parsimony; Experiments; Trust
• ISSN: 1386-4157; 1573-6938
• DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9156-7

This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negative reciprocity, in addition to unconditional other-regarding preferences. Second movers can be motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences as well as positive or negative reciprocity. The experimental designs include control treatments that discriminate among actions with alternative motivations. Data from our three experiments and a fourth one are used to explore methodological questions, including the effects on behavioral hypothesis tests of within-subjects vs. across-subjects designs, single-blind vs. double-blind payoffs, random vs. dictator first-mover control treatments, and strategy responses vs. sequential play.