Multi-player contests with asymmetric information

We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) in which some players know the value of the prize, others do not. We show that if the prize is always of positive value, then all players are active in equilibrium. If the prize is of value zero with positive probab...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomic theory Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 277 - 287
Main Author Warneryd, Karl
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Berlin/Heidelberg Springer 01.10.2012
Springer-Verlag
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Aggregate expenditures
Analysis
Asymmetric information
Athletes
Auction theory
Auctions
Awards (Prizes)
Bids
Contests
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Equilibrium
Expected utility
Expenditures
Game Theory
Information asymmetry
Information economics
Lotteries
Microeconomics
Probability
Public Finance
Rent seeking behavior
Social and Behav. Sciences
Studies
Symposium
Value
Zero
United States
Asymmetric information
All-pay auctions
D44
Contests
K41
D72
C72
D82
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Summary:We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) in which some players know the value of the prize, others do not. We show that if the prize is always of positive value, then all players are active in equilibrium. If the prize is of value zero with positive probability, then there is some threshold number of informed players such that if there are less, all uninformed players are active, and otherwise all uninformed players are inactive.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-009-0472-y