The Role of Supplementary Statements with Management Earnings Forecasts

We investigate managers' decisions to supplement their firms' management earnings forecasts. We classify these supplementary disclosures as qualitative "soft talk" disclosures or verifiable forward-looking statements. We find that managers provide soft talk disclosures with simil...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of accounting research Vol. 41; no. 5; pp. 867 - 890
Main Authors Hutton, Amy P., Miller, Gregory S., Skinner, Douglas J.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishing, Inc 01.12.2003
The Institute of Professional Accounting, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Wiley Blackwell
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
SeriesJournal of Accounting Research
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Summary:We investigate managers' decisions to supplement their firms' management earnings forecasts. We classify these supplementary disclosures as qualitative "soft talk" disclosures or verifiable forward-looking statements. We find that managers provide soft talk disclosures with similar frequency for good and bad news forecasts but are more likely to supplement good news forecasts with verifiable forward-looking statements. We examine the market response to these forecasts and find that bad news earnings forecasts are always informative but that good news forecasts are informative only when supplemented by verifiable forward-looking statements, supporting our argument that these statements bolster the credibility of good news forecasts.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-HTKJVRFD-W
ArticleID:JOAR126
istex:19F4C358966C76556E987F9B52070E958A188513
ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0021-8456
1475-679X
DOI:10.1046/j.1475-679X.2003.00126.x