The Role of Supplementary Statements with Management Earnings Forecasts
We investigate managers' decisions to supplement their firms' management earnings forecasts. We classify these supplementary disclosures as qualitative "soft talk" disclosures or verifiable forward-looking statements. We find that managers provide soft talk disclosures with simil...
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Published in | Journal of accounting research Vol. 41; no. 5; pp. 867 - 890 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Oxford, UK and Boston, USA
Blackwell Publishing, Inc
01.12.2003
The Institute of Professional Accounting, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago Wiley Blackwell Blackwell Publishing Ltd |
Series | Journal of Accounting Research |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | We investigate managers' decisions to supplement their firms' management earnings forecasts. We classify these supplementary disclosures as qualitative "soft talk" disclosures or verifiable forward-looking statements. We find that managers provide soft talk disclosures with similar frequency for good and bad news forecasts but are more likely to supplement good news forecasts with verifiable forward-looking statements. We examine the market response to these forecasts and find that bad news earnings forecasts are always informative but that good news forecasts are informative only when supplemented by verifiable forward-looking statements, supporting our argument that these statements bolster the credibility of good news forecasts. |
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Bibliography: | ark:/67375/WNG-HTKJVRFD-W ArticleID:JOAR126 istex:19F4C358966C76556E987F9B52070E958A188513 ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0021-8456 1475-679X |
DOI: | 10.1046/j.1475-679X.2003.00126.x |