Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution

• Published in: Environmental & resource economics Vol. 29; no. 2; pp. 231 - 252
• Main Authors: Alpízar, Francisco, Requate, Till, Schram, Albert
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 01.10.2004; Springer Nature B.V
• Series: Environmental & Resource Economics
• Subjects: Coffee; Design; Economics; Environment; Environmental policy; environmental regulation; Environmental regulations; Experimental economics; Experiments; Fines & penalties; Games; Hypotheses; Laboratories; non-point pollution; Nonpoint source pollution; Pollutants; Pollution; Pollution control; Regulation; Sample size; Students; Studies; subject pool; Subsidies; Costa Rica

This paper presents an experimental study oftwo different pollution compliance games:collective vis-à-vis random fining as ameans to regulate non-pointpollution. Using samples from both Costa Ricancoffee mill managers and Costa Rican students,we find that the two games perform equivalentlybut, altho...