Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution

This paper presents an experimental study oftwo different pollution compliance games:collective vis-à-vis random fining as ameans to regulate non-pointpollution. Using samples from both Costa Ricancoffee mill managers and Costa Rican students,we find that the two games perform equivalentlybut, altho...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inEnvironmental & resource economics Vol. 29; no. 2; pp. 231 - 252
Main Authors Alpízar, Francisco, Requate, Till, Schram, Albert
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 01.10.2004
Springer Nature B.V
SeriesEnvironmental & Resource Economics
Subjects
Coffee
Design
Economics
Environment
Environmental policy
environmental regulation
Environmental regulations
Experimental economics
Experiments
Fines & penalties
Games
Hypotheses
Laboratories
non-point pollution
Nonpoint source pollution
Pollutants
Pollution
Pollution control
Regulation
Sample size
Students
Studies
subject pool
Subsidies
Costa Rica
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:This paper presents an experimental study oftwo different pollution compliance games:collective vis-à-vis random fining as ameans to regulate non-pointpollution. Using samples from both Costa Ricancoffee mill managers and Costa Rican students,we find that the two games perform equivalentlybut, although they lead to efficient outcomesthrough Nash play in the majority of cases, theobserved frequency of Nash play is lower thantheoretically predicted. Moreover, we rejectthe hypothesis that managers and studentsbehave equally. Off the equilibrium, managerstend to over-abate, whereas students tend tounder-abate. This result suggests theimportance of considering subject pooldifferences in the evaluation of environmentalpolicies by means of experiments, particularlyif those policies involve certain forms ofmanagement decisions. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
Bibliography:SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ObjectType-Article-2
content type line 23
ObjectType-Article-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
ISSN:0924-6460
1573-1502
DOI:10.1023/B:EARE.0000044608.66145.0c