Criminal Recidivism after Prison and Electronic Monitoring

We study criminal recidivism in Argentina by focusing on the rearrest rates of two groups: individuals released from prison and individuals released from electronic monitoring. Detainees are randomly assigned to judges, and ideological differences across judges translate into large differences in th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Journal of political economy Vol. 121; no. 1; pp. 28 - 73
Main Authors Di Tella, Rafael, Schargrodsky, Ernesto
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chicago University of Chicago Press 01.02.2013
University of Chicago, acting through its Press
Subjects
Argentina
Arrests
Causality
Crime Rates
Criminal allegations
Criminal offenses
Criminals
Criminology
Digital technology
Economic theory
Electronic monitoring
Ideology
Judges
Latin America
Law
Monitoring
Political economy
Prisoners
Prisons
Property crimes
Recidivism
Sexual offenses
Studies
Argentina
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Summary:We study criminal recidivism in Argentina by focusing on the rearrest rates of two groups: individuals released from prison and individuals released from electronic monitoring. Detainees are randomly assigned to judges, and ideological differences across judges translate into large differences in the allocation of electronic monitoring to an otherwise similar population. Using these peculiarities of the Argentine setting, we argue that there is a large, negative causal effect on criminal recidivism of treating individuals with electronic monitoring relative to prison.
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ISSN:0022-3808
1537-534X
DOI:10.1086/669786