Rationality in Leviathan : Hobbes and his game-theoretic admirers

Game theoretic analyses of Hobbes' Leviathan proliferate. By considering elements of Leviathan, which have been scrutinised inter alia by Gauthier, Hampton and Kavka, I argue that the approach capture Hobbes' notion of obligation insufficiently. I search for a concept of rationality in Hob...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe European journal of the history of economic thought Vol. 12; no. 2; pp. 191 - 213
Main Author Peacock, Mark S
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Taylor & Francis Ltd 01.06.2005
Taylor and Francis Journals
Taylor & Francis LLC
SeriesEuropean Journal of the History of Economic Thought
Subjects
Civil law
Commonwealth
Economic theory
Economists
Game theory
History of economic thought
Hobbes
Hobbes, Thomas
Leviathan
Literature
Nature
Political economy
Political theory
Rationality
Regression analysis
Religion
state of nature
Studies
Survival
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Summary:Game theoretic analyses of Hobbes' Leviathan proliferate. By considering elements of Leviathan, which have been scrutinised inter alia by Gauthier, Hampton and Kavka, I argue that the approach capture Hobbes' notion of obligation insufficiently. I search for a concept of rationality in Hobbes' work that goes beyond that of game theory and find one in his distinction between science and prudence. If one attends to this distinction, one is forced to consider the significance of religion for Hobbes' conception of rationality. This, in turn, forces one to examine the status of Hobbes' 'self-preservation' postulate.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
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ISSN:0967-2567
1469-5936
DOI:10.1080/09672560500112678