Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange

In smooth exchange economies with a continuum of agents, any Walrasian mechanism is Pareto efficient, individually rational, anonymous, and strategy-proof. Barberà and Jackson's recent results imply that no such efficient mechanism is the limit of resource-balanced, individually rational, anony...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inMathematical social sciences Vol. 36; no. 3; pp. 185 - 212
Main Authors Córdoba, José M., Hammond, Peter J.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.12.1998
Elsevier
SeriesMathematical Social Sciences
Subjects
Auctions
Bargaining
Distribution
Equilibrium
Exchange
Mathematical methods
Mechanism design
Pareto efficiency
Random economies
Resource allocation
Strategy-proofness
Walrasian equilibrium
D5
Mechanism design
Random economies
Walrasian equilibrium
Strategy-proofness
D61
D82
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Summary:In smooth exchange economies with a continuum of agents, any Walrasian mechanism is Pareto efficient, individually rational, anonymous, and strategy-proof. Barberà and Jackson's recent results imply that no such efficient mechanism is the limit of resource-balanced, individually rational, anonymous and non-bossy strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for an expanding sequence of finite economies. For a broad class of smooth random exchange economies, relaxing anonymity and non-bossiness admits mechanisms which, as the economy becomes infinitely large, are asymptotically Walrasian for all except one “balancing” agent, while being manipulable with generically vanishing probability. Also considered are some extensions to non-Walrasian mechanisms.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
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ISSN:0165-4896
1879-3118
DOI:10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00038-9