Empirical models of discrete games
This paper develops econometric models for discrete games. Specifically, we model the payoffs of games where a researcher observes qualitative or censored information about agents' decisions and payoffs. These models extend single-person qualitative choice models introduced by McFadden (1974) a...
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Published in | Journal of econometrics Vol. 48; no. 1; pp. 57 - 81 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Amsterdam
Elsevier B.V
01.04.1991
Elsevier North-Holland Pub. Co Elsevier Sequoia S.A |
Series | Journal of Econometrics |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | This paper develops econometric models for discrete games. Specifically, we model the payoffs of games where a researcher observes qualitative or censored information about agents' decisions and payoffs. These models extend single-person qualitative choice models introduced by McFadden (1974) and others to multiple-person choice problems. The equations describing players' equilibrium strategies depend on the game's structure and the equilibrium solution concept. We show that one can describe the equilibria of a simultaneous-move Nash game with a linear system of dummy endogenous variables. We also show that sequential-move and cooperative models have different, but related, econometric structures. A series of applied examples address identification and estimation issues. These examples include models of market entry, technology adoption, tax auditing, and cooperative family labor supply. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0304-4076 1872-6895 |
DOI: | 10.1016/0304-4076(91)90032-9 |