Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena – from logical reasoning biases, over p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Behavioral and brain sciences Vol. 46; pp. e111 - 68
Main Author De Neys, Wim
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.01.2023
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subjects
Cash, Johnny
Cognition & reasoning
Cognitive science
Cooperation
Creativity
Decision making
Dewey, John
Edwards, Kevin
Humans
Intuition - physiology
Kahneman, Daniel
Logan, Gordon D
Low, Jason
Marble
Morality
Morals
Popularity
Target Article
Canada
United States
Philippines
America
Italy
United Kingdom
France
Australia
Ontario
dual process
heuristics
decision making
reasoning
intuition
thinking
deliberation
Dual process
Deliberation
Reasoning
Heuristics
Thinking
Intuition
Decision-Making
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Summary:Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena – from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic – precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.
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ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X2200142X