Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?

In an otherwise neutrally described Prisonersʼ dilemma experiment, we document that behavior is more likely to be cooperative when the game is called the Community Game than when it is called the Stock Market Game. However, the difference vanishes when only one of the subjects is in control of her a...

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Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 76; no. 1; pp. 117 - 130
Main Authors Ellingsen, Tore, Johannesson, Magnus, Mollerstrom, Johanna, Munkhammar, Sara
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Duluth Elsevier Inc 01.09.2012
Elsevier
Academic Press
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Summary:In an otherwise neutrally described Prisonersʼ dilemma experiment, we document that behavior is more likely to be cooperative when the game is called the Community Game than when it is called the Stock Market Game. However, the difference vanishes when only one of the subjects is in control of her action. The social framing effect also vanishes when the game is played sequentially. These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Community label triggers a desire to cooperate, but consistent with the hypothesis that social frames are coordination devices. More generally, our evidence indicates that social frames enter peopleʼs beliefs rather than their preferences. ► We present three theories for why social framing, such as the mere naming of the game, may affect behavior. ► We conduct three Prisonersʼ Dilemma experiments. ► The evidence indicates that social framing primarily affects beliefs, not preferences.
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ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.007