Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry
We investigate the relation between option-based executive compensation and market measures of risk for a sample of commercial banks during the period of 1992–2000. We show that following deregulation, banks have increasingly employed stock option-based compensation. As a result, the structure of ex...
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Published in | Journal of banking & finance Vol. 30; no. 3; pp. 915 - 945 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Amsterdam
Elsevier B.V
01.03.2006
Elsevier Elsevier Sequoia S.A |
Series | Journal of Banking & Finance |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | We investigate the relation between option-based executive compensation and market measures of risk for a sample of commercial banks during the period of 1992–2000. We show that following deregulation, banks have increasingly employed stock option-based compensation. As a result, the structure of executive compensation induces risk-taking, and the stock of option-based wealth also induces risk-taking. The results are robust across alternative risk measures, statistical methodologies, and model specifications. Overall, our results support a management risk-taking hypothesis over a managerial risk aversion hypothesis. Our results have important implications for regulators in monitoring the risk levels of banks. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-2 ObjectType-Feature-1 |
ISSN: | 0378-4266 1872-6372 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.06.004 |