Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry

We investigate the relation between option-based executive compensation and market measures of risk for a sample of commercial banks during the period of 1992–2000. We show that following deregulation, banks have increasingly employed stock option-based compensation. As a result, the structure of ex...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of banking & finance Vol. 30; no. 3; pp. 915 - 945
Main Authors Chen, Carl R., Steiner, Thomas L., Whyte, Ann Marie
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.03.2006
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesJournal of Banking & Finance
Subjects
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Summary:We investigate the relation between option-based executive compensation and market measures of risk for a sample of commercial banks during the period of 1992–2000. We show that following deregulation, banks have increasingly employed stock option-based compensation. As a result, the structure of executive compensation induces risk-taking, and the stock of option-based wealth also induces risk-taking. The results are robust across alternative risk measures, statistical methodologies, and model specifications. Overall, our results support a management risk-taking hypothesis over a managerial risk aversion hypothesis. Our results have important implications for regulators in monitoring the risk levels of banks.
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ISSN:0378-4266
1872-6372
DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.06.004