Alternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems

This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. Our characterizin...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 57; no. 1; pp. 86 - 92
Main Authors Xu, Yongsheng, Yoshihara, Naoki
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Duluth Elsevier Inc 01.10.2006
Elsevier
Academic Press
SeriesGames and Economic Behavior
Subjects
Bargaining
Game theory
Mathematical problems
Solutions
Studies
D70
C78
D60
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Summary:This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nash's original axioms.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.003