Evolution of restraint in a structured rock—paper—scissors community

It is not immediately clear how costly behavior that benefits others evolves by natural selection. By saving on inherent costs, individuals that do not contribute socially have a selective advantage over altruists if both types receive equal benefits. Restrained consumption of a common resource is a...

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Published inProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS Vol. 108; no. Supplement 2; pp. 10831 - 10838
Main Authors Nahum, Joshua R., Harding, Brittany N., Kerr, Benjamin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published United States National Academy of Sciences 28.06.2011
National Acad Sciences
SeriesColloquium Paper
Subjects
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Summary:It is not immediately clear how costly behavior that benefits others evolves by natural selection. By saving on inherent costs, individuals that do not contribute socially have a selective advantage over altruists if both types receive equal benefits. Restrained consumption of a common resource is a form of altruism. The cost of this kind of prudent behavior is that restrained individuals give up resources to less-restrained individuals. The benefit of restraint is that better resource management may prolong the persistence of the group. One way to dodge the problem of defection is for altruists to interact disproportionately with other altruists. With limited dispersal, restrained individuals persist because of interaction with like types, whereas it is the unrestrained individuals that must face the negative long-term consequences of their rapacity. Here, we study the evolution of restraint in a community of three competitors exhibiting a nontransitive (rock—paper—scissors) relationship. The nontransitivity ensures a form of negative feedback, whereby improvement in growth of one competitor has the counterintuitive consequence of lowering the density of that improved player. This negative feedback generates detrimental long-term consequences for unrestrained growth. Using both computer simulations and evolution experiments with a nontransitive community of Escherichia coli, we find that restrained growth can evolve under conditions of limited dispersal in which negative feedback is present. This research, thus, highlights a set of ecological conditions sufficient for the evolution of one form of altruism.
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Author contributions: J.R.N. and B.K. designed research; J.R.N. and B.N.H. performed research; J.R.N. and B.K. analyzed data; J.R.N., B.N.H., and B.K. wrote the paper; and J.R.N. and B.K. coded the simulations.
Edited by John C. Avise, University of California, Irvine, CA, and approved April 19, 2011 (received for review January 31, 2011)
ISSN:0027-8424
1091-6490
DOI:10.1073/pnas.1100296108