Herding over the career

We develop a model of decision-making when managers have private information about their abilities. With no private information about ability, managers ‘herd’. However, with sufficient private information, managers inefficiently ‘anti-herd’. The model potentially illuminates recent empirical work on...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics letters Vol. 63; no. 3; pp. 327 - 333
Main Authors Avery, Christopher N., Chevalier, Judith A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.06.1999
Elsevier
North Holland
SeriesEconomics Letters
Subjects
Asymmetric information
Career concerns
Decision making
Decision theory
Herding
Information economics
Management
Management techniques
Managerial incentives
Occupations
D20
Managerial incentives
Career concerns
Herding
J41
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Summary:We develop a model of decision-making when managers have private information about their abilities. With no private information about ability, managers ‘herd’. However, with sufficient private information, managers inefficiently ‘anti-herd’. The model potentially illuminates recent empirical work on career concerns.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00039-7