Economics and prescribed fire law in the United States

• Published in: Applied economic perspectives and policy Vol. 25; no. 1; pp. 218 - 233
• Main Authors: Yoder, Jonathan, Tilley, Marcia, Engle, David, Fuhlendorf, Samuel
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford University Press 2003; Blackwell Publishing; Agricultural and Applied Economics Association
• Series: Review of Agricultural Economics
• Subjects: Applied Analyses; Civil negligence; Cost efficiency; Fire damage; K130; K320; Landowners; Legal liability; Prescribed burning; Property damage; Q150; Q230; Statutory law; Strict liability; Wildfires; K130; Q230; K320; Q150
• ISSN: 1058-7195; 2040-5790; 1467-9353; 2040-5804
• DOI: 10.1111/1467-9353.00055

Prescribed burning is increasingly recognized as a useful but risky land management and conservation tool. Common law relating to prescribed fire is generally predicated on negligence rules. However, virtually all states also have statutory law specifying liability rules or criminal penalties for prescribed burning, and the laws in many states have been changing substantially in recent years. We develop an economic model of the incentive and welfare effects of prescribed burning, where both the burner and potential victims of escaped fires can reduce expected damage with precautionary effort. The model provides implications regarding the comparative advantages of strict liability versus negligence rules. We then examine the characteristics and geographic distribution of prescribed fire liability law in the United States in the context of the model. Specifically, we discuss possible economic underpinnings of the recent emergence of statutes in southeastern states that are more supportive of prescribed fire use, despite its associated risks.