A framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with Ethiopian farmers

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collecti...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEnvironment and development economics Vol. 14; no. 5; pp. 641 - 663
Main Authors REICHHUBER, ANKE, CAMACHO, EVA, REQUATE, TILL
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.10.2009
Cambridage University Press
Subjects
Agricultural Policy
Agriculture and Environment Q150
Beehives
Biodiversity
Crop harvesting
Data processing
Deforestation
Developing countries
Development projects
Economic development
Economic Development: Agriculture
Economics
Efficiency
Energy
Enforcement
Environment
Environmental economics
Environmental policy
Equilibrium
Experiments
Farmers
Farming
Field experiments
Food Policy Q180
Forest products
Forest resources
Forests
Game theory
Group dynamics
Harvest
Harvesting
Honey
Irrigation
Land Ownership and Tenure
Land Reform
Land Use
LDCs
Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120
mitigation
Mountains
Nash equilibrium
Natural Resources
Nonpoint source pollution
Other Primary Products O130
Pollution
Pools
Q1
Rain forests
Rainforests
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply (the Commons) Q210
Studies
Subsidies
Tax rates
Tax subsidies
Taxation
Taxes
Timber
Ethiopia
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN1355-770X
1469-4395
DOI10.1017/S1355770X09005178

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Summary:We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments.
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PII:S1355770X09005178
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Environment and Development Economics
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ObjectType-Feature-1
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ObjectType-Article-2
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ISSN:1355-770X
1469-4395
DOI:10.1017/S1355770X09005178