Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of available rep...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of mathematical economics Vol. 41; no. 7; pp. 793 - 811
Main Authors Forges, Françoise, Koessler, Frédéric
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.11.2005
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesJournal of Mathematical Economics
Subjects
Bayesian analysis
Bayesian game
Bayesian method
Communication
Communication equilibrium
Economic theory
Equilibrium
Equilibrium theory
Game theory
Games of strategy
Information
Information certification
Mathematical economics
Revelation principle
Studies
Verifiable types
Bayesian game
Revelation principle
Communication equilibrium
Verifiable types
Information certification
C72
D82
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Summary:This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of available reports for each player that varies with the true state of the world. Given these state-dependent sets of reports, we characterize canonical equilibria for which generalized versions of the revelation principle are valid. Communication equilibria and associated canonical representations are obtained as special cases when no information can be certified.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
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ISSN:0304-4068
1873-1538
DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.006