Assessing policy stability in Iraq: a fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

• Published in: Public choice Vol. 151; no. 3/4; pp. 409 - 423
• Main Authors: Casey, Peter Colum, Wierman, Mark J., Gibilisco, Michael B., Mordeson, John N., Clark, Terry D.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Boston Springer 01.06.2012; Springer US; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Ambivalence; Benchmarks; Coalitions; Constitution; Constitutions; Councils; Economic models; Economic theory; Economics; Economics and Finance; Fuzzy logic; Fuzzy sets; Game theory; Governance; Government and politics; Government cabinets; Government formation; Internal security; Iraq; Legislation; Political parties; Political Science; Political systems; Politics; Preferences; Presidents; Public choice model; Public Finance; Public policy; Set theory; Stability; Studies; Veto; Voting; Websites; Iraq; Fuzzy spatial models; Fuzzy set theory; Iraq; Government formation process; Veto players theory
• ISSN: 0048-5829; 1573-7101
• DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1

The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.