Critical Social Learning: A Solution to Rogers's Paradox of Nonadaptive Culture
Alan Rogers (1988) presented a game theory model of the evolution of social learning, yielding the paradoxical conclusion that social learning does not increase the fitness of a population. We expand on this model, allowing for imperfections in individual and social learning as well as incorporating...
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Published in | American anthropologist Vol. 109; no. 4; pp. 727 - 734 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Oxford, UK
University of California Press
01.12.2007
Blackwell Publishing Ltd American Anthropological Association |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Alan Rogers (1988) presented a game theory model of the evolution of social learning, yielding the paradoxical conclusion that social learning does not increase the fitness of a population. We expand on this model, allowing for imperfections in individual and social learning as well as incorporating a "critical social learning" strategy that tries to solve an adaptive problem first by social learning, and then by individual learning if socially acquired behavior proves unsatisfactory. This strategy always proves superior to pure social learning and typically has higher fitness than pure individual learning, providing a solution to Rogers's paradox of nonadaptive culture. Critical social learning is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) unless cultural transmission is highly unfaithful, the environment is highly variable, or social learning is much more costly than individual learning. We compare the model to empirical data on social learning and on spatial variation in primate cultures and list three requirements for adaptive culture. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0002-7294 1548-1433 1548-1433 |
DOI: | 10.1525/AA.2007.109.4.727 |