Provider responses to discontinuous tariffs: evidence from Dutch rehabilitation care

• Published in: International journal of health care finance and economics Vol. 22; no. 3; pp. 333 - 354
• Main Authors: Gaspar, Katalin, Koolman, Xander
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Springer US 01.09.2022; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Economic Policy; Health Administration; Health care; Health Care Management; Health Economics; Health services; Incentives; Medicine; Medicine & Public Health; Public Finance; Public Health; Rehabilitation; Reimbursement; Research Article; Tariffs; The Netherlands; I18; Provider incentive; Provider payment; Policy evaluation; I11; Regulated competition; I13
• ISSN: 2199-9023; 2199-9031
• DOI: 10.1007/s10754-021-09322-5

Abrupt jumps in reimbursement tariffs have been shown to lead to unintended effects in physicians’ behavior. A sudden change in tariffs at a pre-defined point in the treatment can incentivize health care providers to prolong treatment to reach the higher tariff, and then to discharge patients once the higher tariff is reached. The Dutch reimbursement schedule in hospital rehabilitation care follows a two-threshold stepwise-function based on treatment duration. We investigated the prevalence of strategic discharges around the first threshold and assessed whether their share varies by provider type. Our findings suggest moderate response to incentives by traditional care providers (general and academic hospitals, rehabilitation centers and multicategorical providers), and strong response by profit-oriented independent treatment centers. When examining the variation in response based on the financial position of the organization, we found a higher probability of manipulation among providers in financial distress. Our findings provide multiple insights and possible indicators to identify provider types that may be more prone to strategic behavior.