Assessing DER network cybersecurity defences in a power-communication co-simulation environment

• Published in: IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory & Applications Vol. 5; no. 3; pp. 274 - 282
• Main Authors: Johnson, Jay, Onunkwo, Ifeoma, Cordeiro, Patricia, Wright, Brian J, Jacobs, Nicholas, Lai, Christine
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Southampton The Institution of Engineering and Technology 01.09.2020; John Wiley & Sons, Inc; Wiley
• Subjects: adversary impact; co-simulation environment; Communication; Communication networks; Communications equipment; Control algorithms; Control equipment; control network; Control systems; Cybersecurity; cybersecurity metrics; cybersecurity posture; DER communication networks; DER equipment; DER grid support service effectiveness; DER network cybersecurity defences; DER‐based grid control systems; Distributed generation; distributed power generation; Electric power distribution; Electric power grids; electric power system; Electric power systems; Energy sources; grid operations; increasing penetrations; Infrastructure; interconnected to simulated communication network equipment; Internet; Internet of Things; Interoperability; interoperable distributed energy resources; malicious control; Moving targets; Network latency; network segmentation; open systems; Power; power grids; power system attack surface; power system performance; power-communication; public internet; Research Article; security of data; Simulation; smart power grids; Software; software tools; substantial disturbances; SunSpec‐compliant photovoltaic inverters; target defence security features; telecommunication security; Virtual environments; virtual machines; United States > US; California; telecommunication security; DER communication networks; interconnected to simulated communication network equipment; open systems; network segmentation; power-communication; grid operations; smart power grids; distributed power generation; cybersecurity metrics; DER network cybersecurity defences; malicious control; co-simulation environment; electric power system; control network; DER grid support service effectiveness; DER equipment; software tools; power grids; DER-based grid control systems; target defence security features; cybersecurity posture; power system performance; public internet; adversary impact; security of data; substantial disturbances; virtual machines; interoperable distributed energy resources; Internet; power system attack surface; increasing penetrations; SunSpec-compliant photovoltaic inverters
• ISSN: 2398-3396; 2398-3396
• DOI: 10.1049/iet-cps.2019.0084

Increasing penetrations of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric power system are expanding the power system attack surface. Maloperation or malicious control of DER equipment can now cause substantial disturbances to grid operations. Fortunately, many options exist to defend and limit adversary impact on these newly-created DER communication networks, which typically traverse the public internet. However, implementing these security features will increase communication latency, thereby adversely impacting real-time DER grid support service effectiveness. In this work, a collection of software tools called SCEPTRE was used to create a co-simulation environment where SunSpec-compliant photovoltaic inverters were deployed as virtual machines and interconnected to simulated communication network equipment. Network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defence security features were deployed on the control network to evaluate their influence on cybersecurity metrics and power system performance. The results indicated that adding these security features did not impact DER-based grid control systems but improved the cybersecurity posture of the network when implemented appropriately.