Learning strategic environments: an experimental study of strategy formation and transfer

I present an experiment on learning about a game in an initially unknown environment. Subjects play repeatedly simple 2 × 2 normal-form coordination games. I compare behavioral learning algorithms for different feedback information. Minimal feedback only informs about own payoffs, while additional f...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inTheory and decision Vol. 71; no. 4; pp. 539 - 558
Main Author Nicklisch, Andreas
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Boston Springer US 01.10.2011
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Algorithms
Analysis
Applied sciences
Behavior
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Codes
Coordination
Decision making
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Equilibrium
Exact sciences and technology
Experimental economics
Experimentelle Ökonomik
Experiments
Feedback
Finance
Game Theory
Games
General aspects
Insurance
Learning
Management
Operational research and scientific management
Operational research. Management science
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Social and Behav. Sciences
Spieltheorie
Statistics for Business
Strategic behaviour
Studies
Feedback information
D84
Experimental economics
Decision algorithm
D83
Learning about the game
Coordination
Normal form
Empirical method
Feedback regulation
Game theory
Learning
Permutation matrix
Economy
Behavioral analysis
Feedback
Player strategy
Learning algorithm
Impulse
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0040-5833
1573-7187
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9266-3

Cover

More Information
Summary:I present an experiment on learning about a game in an initially unknown environment. Subjects play repeatedly simple 2 × 2 normal-form coordination games. I compare behavioral learning algorithms for different feedback information. Minimal feedback only informs about own payoffs, while additional feedback informs about own payoffs and the opponent’s choice. Results show that minimal feedback information leads to a myopic learning algorithm, while additional feedback induces non-myopic learning and increases the impulse with which players respond to payoff differences. Finally, there is evidence for a strategy transfer across games which differ only according to the relabel of actions, but not according to permutation in the payoff matrix.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ObjectType-Article-2
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0040-5833
1573-7187
DOI:10.1007/s11238-011-9266-3